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Can You Bank On It? Italy's Response to the
Second Banking Directive of the
European Community

On December 15, 1989, the European Council1 adopted the
Second Council Directive (Second Directive): describing it as
1. The European Council is composed of the heads of state of the member
countries comprising the European Community.
Council Directive 891646, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1. The two principal methods
2.
for implementing European Community legislation are the regulation and the
directive. Although the regulation is the stronger of the methods, the directive is
required by law in specific areas, and may be the most effective tool in those
areas. David Anderson, Inadequate Implementation of EEC Directives: A Roadblock
on the Way to 19922, 11 B.C. INl"I, & COMP. L. REV. 91 (1988). Mr. Anderson
provides a clear explanation of what directives are and how they function.
The First Banking Directive was adopted in 1977. It identifies five basic
categories that the European Council has targeted for harmonization:
(1) rules abolishing barriers along Member State borders with respect to
the provision of banking services, (2) rules providing for the freedom of
[European Community (EC)] credit institutions to establish branches in
other Member States, (3) uniform rules concerning essential authorization
requirements for credit institutions, (4) uniform rules concerning essential
supervisory standards, and (5) rules providing for (uniform) treatment of
non-[EC] credit institutions.
Michael Gruson & Werner Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive of the European
INPL
Economic Community and Its Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12 FORDHAM
L.J. 205, 207-08 (1989); see also, First Council Directive 771'780 of 12 December
1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 20 O.J.
(L 322) 1 [hereinafter First Directive].
The First Directive does not provide the complete procedures for realizing these
targets, but it does lay the groundwork for the internal integration of EC banking
laws. Although the First Directive provides for registration of Community banking
institutions in the home country, it leaves some areas unchecked. For example,
under the First Directive a Member State could still require registration of a foreign banking institution within its territory as a prerequisite to doing business if it
required the same thing of its own institutions. Moreover, the First Directive does
not address the establishment of non-EC banks within the EC.
Together with other EC banking regulations already in place, the Second Directive is intended to "[r]emove the remaining barriers to freedom of establishment
of branches; and . . . grant full freedom to provide financial services throughout
the EEC." Gruson & Nikowitz, supra, at 210; see also Second Council Directive
891646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of
Credit Institutions and Amending Directive, 32 O.J. (L 386) 1, 1 (first Whereas
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"the essential instrument for the achievement of the internal
market."3 This landmark legislation changes the fundamental
nature of banking in the European Community in two significant ways. First, the directive allows Community citizens to
bank with any financial institution in any country. As a result,
Italian savings will be able to flow in and out of the country
with relative ease. For the purposes of this comment, this flow
of capital will be referred to as the liberalization of capital.
Second, banking licenses, which are issued and regulated by
the home country of the enterprise in accord with the provisions of the directive, will permit a financial institution to do
business anywhere within the Community without the authorization of the host country.' These basic changes or "twin
shocks" will have a significant impact on I t a l ~ . ~
Part I1 of this comment discusses the impact of liberalization of capital and banking deregulation under the Second
Directive on the Italian government and the Italian banking
industry. Part I11 discusses Italy's initial response t o the Second Directive. Part IV discusses what further steps Italy must
take to confront the Second Directive and its effects.

clause) [hereinafter Second Directive]. The Second Directive fulfills this mandate by
removing the three major obstacles left by the First Directive. It (1) permits an
EC credit institution to set up a branch in another Member State with the authorization of its home country only; (2) provides for regulation and restriction at the
Community level, thus liberating non-EC institutions from the intricate web of
banking regulations and restrictions in each Member State; and (3) removes the
"endowment capital" requirements.
The First and Second Banking Directives were issued in pursuance of the goals
outlined in the White Paper issued by the Commission of the European Communities which contains over 300 proposals for integration of the entire Community
market by December 31, 1992. The m i t e Paper was to realize the four freedoms
of the Treaty of Rome: (1) free movement of goods (Articles 48-58); (2) free movement of persons (Articles 48-58); (3) freedom to provide services (Articles 59-66);
and (4) free circulation of capital (Articles 67-73). Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1958). An
English translation is located at 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 151. The parameters of this comment are delineated by the two latter freedoms.
3.
Second Directive, supra note 2, at 1. The goal of a unitary European market includes a unitary monetary system. The existence of a unitary monetary
system may be far in the future but it is inevitable. Clyde Mitchell, Unified Banking in Europe by 1993, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 28, 1988, at 3.
4.
Second Directive, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Banking, Italian Style, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1989, at 26.
6.
Although this article focuses on Italy, the Second Directive will also have a
substantial impact on other European countries, such as Spain and Greece.

ITALY'S RESPONSE
OF THE SECOND
DIRECTIVEON
11. IMPACT
ITALY

Italy is ill-prepared for both the liberalization of capital
movement and banking deregulation-two elements critical to
the Second Directive's goal of European financial integration.'

A. Capital Liberalization and the
Italian Government
The imminent liberalization of capital within the Community presents significant problems for Italy. Italy's domestic
savings provide a safe harbor for its government's fiscal policies. Because of extensive governmental control and regulation,
the government has faced virtually no competition for Italian
savings. "[This] lack of competition. . . made it easier for the
government to sell its bonds.'" In the wake of deregulation, the
government fears that Italian savers will be lured to the more
efficient and higher-yielding institutions of other Member
States, whether they be located within Italy or in the other
Member States. Thus, h d s would be channeled from Italian
government bonds into other areas and perhaps out of Italy
altogether.
Numerous commentators have observed that the biggest
problem Italy faces in relation to harmonization of the European financial market is its deficit.' Italy's deficit approaches
nearly two-thirds of the United States' deficit, yet the gross
domestic product (GDP) is only one-seventeenth of the United
States'.'' Italy's deficit is close to, if not over, its yearly
GDP? The deficit problem has reached such proportions that
7.
See Big Whimper?, ECONOMIST,February 27, 1988, at 14, 15 (Supp.) (Survey: The Italian Economy); The Japan of Europe? Italy is Enjoying Spirited
' BUS. & FIN. WKLY., May 2, 1988, a t 14 [hereinafter The
Growth, BARRON'SNATL
Japan of Europe?].
8. Public hfligacy, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 27, 1988, a t 10, 13 (Supp.) (Survey: The
Italian Economy).
9.
Lamberto Dini, The Italian Financial System in the Perspective of 1992, 167
Q. REV. 441 (1988); Noel Negretti, Italy: Economy is Sulging
BANCANAZIONALE
Ahead, Spurring Export Demand, BUS. AM., Apr. 10, 1989, at 10; Richard
Waddington, Italy Cabinet Approves Plan to Slash State Deficit, THE REUTERLIBRARY REPORT,Sept. 28, 1990, BC Cycle.
10. Waddington, supra note 9; Public Profligacy, supra note 8, at 10; The
Italian Economy; Living with Instability, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1988, at 5 (Supp.)
(Survey: The Italian Economy) [hereinafter The Italian Economy].
11. Public Profligacy, supra note 8, at 10; The Italian Economy, supra note 10,
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if something isn't done soon, the yearly interest payments on
the deficit will exceed the amount the government can borrow.
One naturally asks how a country so laden with debt can
survive, much less rank as the fourth capitalistic economic
power of the world. The answer is that although the Italian
people seem to live faithfully by the maxim carpe diem," they
are ironically the world's number one savers of disposable income. Italians save an incredible twenty-three percent of their
disposable income compared to eighteen percent for the Japanese and only four percent for United States citizens.13
The increased competition that the government will face in
borrowing money will likely force it to go outside of Italy to
finance its debt. Finding such fmancing could be difficult considering current world and European financial conditions."
The traditional softness of the lira and the current government
debt structure justifiably worry foreign investors.15
Considering the lack of funds the Italian government may
soon face, some fear that Italy may resort to restrictive adjustment measures to delay the full effect of the transition.16 Because Italy is "second only to [Greece] in ignoring EEC
rules,"" there may be cause for concern in regard to the Second Directive. Particularly since it expressly provides for limited exercise of "safeguard clauses." Italy might use these clauses
at 5; . Italy's GDP may actually be higher if the product of the black market were
sr,
included in the calculation. Lies, Damned Lies and Italy's GDP, E c o ~ o ~ ~Feb.
27, 1988, at 4 (Supp.) (Survey: The Italian Economy).
h in Italian. "Seize the day" in English. As Italy's cuisine
12. Cogliere il g
and many fashion designers indicate, Italians would seem to also live by an Italian
proverb that states, "Better to live one day as a lion than a thousand as a sheep."
13. Public Profligacy, supra note 8, at 10. The reason for these personal stockpiles is not entirely clear. As the six-digit numbers required for a week's supply of
groceries indicate, the lira lost its value after World War II. There is no history of
constancy in the lira which would explain the phenomenon. Perhaps it stems from
the close familial ties of Italians and the desire of parents to provide security for
their children and grandchildren. It may also be that Italians have a strong
aversion to personal debt. Regardless of the reason, the fact is that Italians save a
staggering amount of their personal income. There is some concern that the
younger generation of Italians might not be as willing to stockpile as much of its
disposable income as past generations, thus eroding one of the traditional bases of
domestic financial strength. It is very likely that many young Italians will no
longer be content with supplying the world with high fashion and other ?talian"
commodities while foregoing consumption in order to finance the debt of a wasteful
government. See id.
14. Patrick Hosking, Banking on the Future, EUROPE,
March 1990, at 6, 9.
15. Italy's Debt Dilemnur, ECONOMIST,
April 14, 1990, at 87.
16. Dini, supm note 9, at 442.
17. Europe, as the Romm Do It, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 24, 1988, at 68.
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to circumvent Second Directive mandates. So far, however,
Italy has not exercised these clauses and has substantially
complied with the deadlines imposed by the directive;18 whether it will continue to do so remains to be seen as the effects of
liberalization of capital and deregulation increase at the governmental and banking-sector levels.

B. Banking Deregulation and Italy's
Financial Institutions
Banking Deregulation under the Second Directive will
substantially impact Italian financial institutions in both the
Italian and European markets.
1. Italian market
The high rate of savings in Italy will attract vigorous competition from both Community and non-Community financial
institutions.19 As Italy lowers its protectionist barriers, massive domestic savings will be fully accessible to those who are
willing to pay higher interest rates to obtain Italian capital."
Italy may not be ready for the leaner and more competitive
foreign institutions that will certainly move in when Italy is no
longer a provincial market? At present, Italy has a more highly regulated banking industry than any of its European counterparts? The legislation governing Italian banks dates back
to the fascist system." This antiquated financial system holds

18. There are likely many reasons for the compliance, but principal among
these is that Italy needs European monetary unity, and more particularly, a
European Central Bank. uAs a highly open economy that exports goods manufactured with imported inputs, [Italy] is especially vulnerable to external shocks in
relative prices that are quickly translated into domestic price rises." Fabrizio
Saccomami, Italy Needs European Union, J. COM., Mar. 9, 1990, at 8A.
19. Negretti, supra note 9; Italy's Debt Dilemma, supra note 15, at 87.
For example, the Japanese, who have the capacity to endure initial losses
20.
or low returns to gain major market shares, are moving quickly to set up branches
in Rome and Milan. Gary Evans, The Great Stampede I& Italy, EUROMONEY,
Dec.
1988, at 43.
21.
James R. Kraus, Deregulation Seen a s Blow to Italian Banks, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 9, 1990, at 14.
22.
Gary Humphreys, Italy's Banks Face the Battle, EUROMONEX,
Sept. 1988, at
76 (Special supp.); Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 13.
23.
On to 1992, ECONOMIS~,
May 26, 1990, at 19, 20; see also, SALVATORE
MAsrROPASQUA, THE BANKINGSYSTEM IN THE COUNTRIES
OF THE EEC: INSTITUTIONAL AND
STRUCTURAL
ASPECTS(1978); Linda Stringfellow, Sheltered Ezistence, BANKER, Sept.
1989, at 74.
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back Italy's thriving and modern industry.*
Italian banking regulations are a quagmire of complex
restrictions and rules? The product, and perhaps the aim, of
such burdensome regulation is twofold: (1)to keep huge capital
stores in Italy where the government can use them to finance
its deficit; and (2) to protect a weak Italian banking industry.
One reason that regulation is so extensive is that Italian
Governbanks are mostly owned by the Italian
ment ownership is a fundamental part of the oligarchical naBanking positions
ture of government and business in Ital~.~'
are awarded on the basis of political cronyism, known as
lottizzazi~ne;~~
the top posts are awarded to members of the
ruling political party who in turn staff their respective institutions with colleagues and friends.29
An additional complication affecting Italy's ability to comply with the Second Directive is that southern Italy is considerably less wealthy than northern Italy.3o The rich North may
be ready to a t least evaluate and confront the challenges of the
Second Directive whereas the poor South may not. The South
may impede progress toward realization of the banking goals
which northern industry is eager to realize. Given that the gap
between the two is ever-widening, the South's main concern
'
seems to be simply keeping pace with the N ~ r t h . ~Implementing Second Directive mandates in the South may be practically

The Italian Economy, supra note 10, at 3.
24.
MASTROPASQUA,
supra note 23, at 115; see also Humphreys, supra note 22,
25.
a t 78.
The state not only oversees the system but almost completely administers i t
26.
through the Bank of Italy. Statistics indicate that "80% of the banking system is
state-controlled." Big Whimper?, supra note 7, a t 14. The remaining 20% is probably so heavily influenced by the other 8Wo that the Italian government has practical control over that also. See On to 1992, supra note 23, at 20.
27.
The control of most industry is in the hands of a few families, the Agnellis
of Fiat being the most powerful. Europe's Japanese, THE ECONOMIST,
May 26, 1990,
a t 26.
28.
Lottizzazione has been described as "the habit of filling top banking posts
with political acolytes." It&li.un Banking: Political Princes, ECONOMIST,
June 2,
1990, a t 82.
29.
This is a problem that plagues Italy not only in the banking sector but in
almost all areas of government and industry.
30.
Mad Dogs and Mafiosi, ECONOMIST,
May 26, 1990, at 21. The NortWSouth
situation presents numerous problems to Italy, fraudulent banking practices being
only one. As Italy prepares for complete European integration in 1992, it must
realize that the Community will likely not tolerate Italy's apparent inability to
eradicate these practices.
31.
Id. at 21.
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impossible.
Italy now fears deregulation will make the financial products of foreign institutions much more appealing than its own.
Until now, Italy's investors and savers haven't had many choices in financial services. Before the First and, more sigdicantly, the Second Banking Directives, "Italian savers were forced
to buy the only dish on the menu"t2 when they have more
choices, they will most likely choose more lucrative opportunities.
Foreign institutions in Italy that attract depositors may
divert or transfer those funds to their own or other European
countries to finance more profitable ventures than the 1tdian
budget deficit. Moreover, Italian investors may seek out investment and saving opportunities in other Member States thereby
removing the funds directly from the reach of their own government.
Many analysts believe that when controls are lifted and
Italian savers become more familiar with the financial services
that institutions in other Member States offer, they will leave
the governmeneand the banks-without a source of fiu~ds.~~
Some say they have already begun to do so. "In 1988, out of a
total of 180,000 billion lire ($138 billion) of new savings, 2%
was invested in foreign sec~rities."~
Italy stands t o fare poorly against foreign competition.
Heavy regulation has created an inefficient banking industry.
The service that Italian banks offer to their customers is "grosFor example, waiting in line an hour or two
sly ineffi~ient."~'
for a simple transaction is routine? Banks are weighted
down by excessive and ineffective personnel?' Italian banks
have fewer branch offices than the banks of any other Europe-

32.
Humphreys, supra note 22, at 78.
33.
Italy's Debt Dilemma, supra note 15, at 87. One observer predicts that
"Italian investors will become more sophisticated in investing overseas and will buy
Japanese bonds and equities." Evans, supra note 20, at 43; see also Family Credit,
BANKER,Oct. 1989, at 25, 25-26.
34.
Italy's Debt Dilemma, supra note 15, at 87.
35. Banking, Italian Style, supra note 5, at 26.
36.
Italy: The Odd Country, ECONOMIST,
May 26, 1990, at 3. The author confirms these accounts by way of personal experience, having had, on one occasion,
to wait two hours, in three different lines, to cash a traveler's check.
37.
Paolo Forcellini, Affari sen= confini, L'ESPRESSO,Jan. 8, 1990, at 146. Italy
averages 22.7 employees per branch office, by far the highest out of its European
neighbors, Japan or the United States. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 14.
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an country.38The processing of checks and drafts takes markMost
edly longer than anywhere else in the Comm~nity?~
Italians do not even accept checks.40These difficulties dramatically increase the challenge Italy's financial institutions face
as they try not only to maintain domestic market share-until
now Italy's financial institutions have held virtually one hundred percent of the market-but also to attract foreign investors and saverdl
2. European market
Many of the same obstacles that keep Italy's financial
institutions from being profitable domestically may also keep
them from competing with other Member States' institutions in
their respective countries. This means that Italy would certainly lose a significant opportunity. Furthermore, the very existence of Italy's financial institutions may be at stake. Given the
economies of scale in an integrated market, European banks of
the h t u r e may need to establish branches throughout Europe
to survive.
The Italian system has favored small banks that cater to
the needs of the small investor. Consequently, several of Italy's
banks are ~ndercapitalized:~Because of this, these banks will
not be able t o meet the requirements the Second Directive
imposes as a condition to expanding banking operations in
other countries.43
To compete abroad, many Italian financial institutions
might consider merging with other financial institutions. However, mergers are costly and burdened by the intricacies of
regional politics and cultural differences." Some comrnenta-

38. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 14.
39. Id. "A Bank of Italy study showed that the average [check] takes 29 days
to clear compared to three to 10 days in other countries." Humphreys, supra note
22, at 76.
40. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 14.
41.
Giuliano Amato, Italian Minister of the Treasury, stated that when an Italian realizes that he can accomplish in one day at a foreign bank what it takes a
week to accomplish at an Italian bank, he will be induced to patronize the foreign
bank. Salvatore Gatti, Deciderd il rigore, L'ESPRESSO,Jan. 8, 1989, at 140, 141.
42.
David Lane, Discipline Time, BANKER,Od. 1989, at 64, 65; Playing by the
Same Rules, BANKER,Aug. '1987, at 39.
43. Banking, Italian Styk, supra note 5, at 27.
44. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 15. The importance of cultural clashes in
banking administration and organization should not be overlooked. Hosking, supra
note 14, at 9.
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tors argue that even with the tightening of alliances, actual
mergers will be rare?' Such mergers are costly because most
of the smaller banks are profitable given the Italian propensity
to save." Italy faces a perplexing situation: mergers are necessary now to deal with the new European market that could
lure away domestic savers while savers are keeping their money at home, making such mergers very expensive.
As previously mentioned, costs of banking are high in Italy
compared to other Member States? Citizens of other Member
States who are accustomed to more efficient domestic financial
institutions will not buy Italian financial services abroad unless they are competitively priced.
111. ITALY'SPOSSIBLERBSPONSE TO THE
SECOND
DIRECTIVE

In evaluating how Italy will respond to the mandates of
the Second Directive, it is useful to fmt review Italy's past
response to problems posed by European integration.

A. Traditional Response to Problems
As each new phase of European integration has approached, many have doubted whether Italy would be willing or
able to meet the deadline. Just when such compliance seemed
all but impossible, Italy somehow managed t o overcome its
impediments and perform." As one commentator noted:
Every time Italy has been faced with meeting the demands
put on it by its fellow-Europeans, at the birth of the European
Economic Community in 1957 or at the start of the European
Monetary system in 1979, doom-laden voices have predicted
the worst; Italy, they have declared, would not be up to it.
Each time they have been wrong. Italy has not only been up
to it, it has excelled. So when Italians voted in a referendum
last June on European integration, they endorsed it on a
grand scale."

Thus, Italy has frequently proved its ability to overcome

45.
46.
47.
48.

Forcellini, supra note 37, at 148.
Lane, supra note 42, at 64; Big Whimper?, supm note 7, at 15.
Forcellini, supra note 37, at 148.
Perhaps this ingenuity helped transform the nation from its post World
War 11 ruin into the industrial giant that it is today.
49.
On to 1992, supra note 23, at 19.
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what have seemed insurmountable obstacles. The obstacles
that the Second Directive has created in the k a n c i a l sector
seem to be particularly insurmountable. Italy may, however, be
up to the challenge.
Italy is a prosperous nation. This prosperity is founded
upon Italy's recovery from the recession of the 1970s and its
tremendous economic growth i n the 1 9 6 0 s . ~Italy's
~
industry
demonstrates high growth rates in productivity and an ability
to cut coststl this industry is modern and recently retooled.
In the past decade, Italy had the fastest growth rate of all
European economies.52 Its GDP ranks fourth among the world's top capitalistic economic powers, ahead of both Great Britain and France.53 Some suggest that if Italy's black market
were taken into account, its GDP would rank third among the
world's top economies."
One commentator has suggested that Italy is economically
stable and that now the major questions are political.
If [these political questionsl are resolved satisfactorily, Italy
will not only prosper and flourish economically, it will become
a thoroughly modem state in every sense. If they are not,
Italy will continue to achieve much less than its economic
potential, and at the same time continue in political terms to
be an odd-man-out in Europe."

B. Response to the Second Directive
Although much remains to do in regard to the Second Directive, Italy has begun to make significant progress.
1 . Capital liberalization

Although there may be problems in financing the deficit,
the Government bond market in Italy is the third largest in the
world. Perhaps this fact, along with the likely future dependence on bond financing for years to come, will make the mar50. Europe's Japanese, supra note 27, at 26; Italy: The Odd Country, supra
note 36, at 3; me Japan of Europe?, supm note 7 , at 14.
51. Europe's Japanese, supra note 27, at 29; T;he Japan of Europe? supra note
7 , at 14.
52.
The Italian Economy, supra note 10, at 3.
53. Lies, Damned Lies and Italy's GDP, supra note 11, at 4 .
54. Id. It is reported that Italy's black market ranges from 20% to 30% of its
GDP. Id.
55. Italy: The Odd Country, supm note 36, at 3.
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ket attractive to foreign investors and make Italy's search for
future financing less intense.
2. Banking deregulation
In 1989 major legislation was proposed to help streamline
the banking sector? This has given banks and companies
"more scope in foreign currency dealings."57 Italian savings
banks are becoming stronger by increasing their capital ratio~.~~
Privatization is one of the key features that Italy has undertaken to improve its banking sector and meet the mandates
of the Second Directive. Privatization has made one bank,
Mediobanca, very profitable." It was previously owned by
three banks that were owned by the Italian government.BOWresting Mediobanca control from lottizzazione and political wrangling was difficult, but it was done?
The progress of Italy's financial institutions is also evidenced by the provision of more efficient means of conducting transactions. Italy is participating in linking systems that allow
customers to gain access to their accounts in all of Europe
through automatic teller machines.62
Although Italy faces many negative effects of regulation
under the Second Directive, "the parochiality of Italian banking
has protected it from over-exposure to U.S. real estate or Third
World debt."63 In fact, Italy has virtually no third-world exposure.
There may be a 'lag time" within which Italy's banking
industry can make the necessary reforms under the Second
Directive. Some even argue that Italians haven't sought invest-

56.

Major New Legislation to Help Streamline the Banking Sector, BARRON'S

NAT'LBUS. & FIN. WKLY.,Dec. 11, 1989, a t 47.
57. More Haste, EcoNOMI~,Nov. 26, 1988, at 54.
58. Lane, supra note 42, at 64.
59. Decision Impossible, ECONOMI~,
May 26, 1990, at 13.
IRI, Industria per la ricostruzione italiana (Industry for Italian Reconstruc60.
tion), the holding company of the Italian government, was originally formed to aid
economic restructuring after World War 11. As is true for many governments, this
agency grew beyond its original scope and became a method of strict government
control over services and industry.
Ystituto San Paolo di Torinon and "Banca Commerciale Italianan are also
61.
highly efficient. On to 1992, supm note 23, at 20.
62.
Cash Dispenser Network Expands, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 18, 1990, at
39.
63. Banking, Italian Style, supra note 5, at 26.
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ment opportunities abroad, nor will they do

IV. FURTHER
STEPSITALY
MUSTTAKE
Although Italy has several points of strength and has made
s i w c a n t progress, there are further steps that it must take
to prepare for an integrated European financial market.

A. Liberalization of Capital Movement
In order to meet the challenge of the liberalization of capital movement, Italy must reduce its deficit. What Italy now
faces makes the United States' Gramm-Rudrnan goals look
simple. Yet, according to one commentator, Italy has something
more effective than Gramm-Rudman-it has the European
C o r n m ~ n i t y Unity
. ~ ~ is imminent, and even if parity with the
other Member States is not possible, Italy must begin to reform
its fiscal policies. Italy must take two significant steps to implement the needed reform: it must (1) raise more revenue by
increasing taxes or by improving its collection procedures; and
(2) reduce government spending?
Italy's tax revenue could best be increased by improving
collection, rather than by raising taxes. Better collection procedures could solve many of Italy's fiscal problems. Tax evasion is
a way of life in Italy. One commentator asserts tax revenues
Some estimate that forty-five
are collected with a ~olander.~'

See Maurizio Maggi & Maurizio Valentini, Conti Aperti, L'ESPRESSO,May
64.
13, 1990, at 140, 145. Maggi and Valentini interviewed Alvise Cicogna, director of
Chase Gestioni (controlled by Chase Manhattan Bank), who opined that the Italian
saver will not go abroad because of the good returns on government bonds, the
saver's increased ability to physically control his capital when it is in Italy, and
the increased Liquidity of domestic savings and investment. Id. Maggi and Valentini
also interviewed Milvia Groff, director of Banca Euromobiliare and the officer in
charge of the external markets of the merchant bank Euromobiliare, who said that
she has only had one client come to her interested in investing abroad, and that if
a client came to her with a hundred million lire, she would sincerely counsel him
to invest in Italy. Id. Mr. Cicogna's and Ms. Groffs observations may be correct in
the short run. However, given the extensive liberty and access to capital that the
Second Directive prescribes, it is likely that Italians will eventually learn to invest
their money abroad and do so with minimal difEculty as to control, liquidity, and
higher rates of return. Fortunately for Italy, there will likely be a period before
this happens within which it can streamline its banking sector and prepare itself
to compete both domestically and in foreign markets.
65.
Onto 1992, supra note23, at 19.
66. Last of the Big Spenders, ECONOMIST,
May 26, 1990, at 11.
67. Id.
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percent of Italy's total value-added tax goes un~ollected.~~
Higher taxes would not increase revenue rather tax evasion, further
eroding what little faith is left in the system. In addition, tax
increases are highly unlikely because they would produce serious political repercussions. The solution is to enforce the tax
codes as they presently exist not raise taxes.
Reduced government spending is also essential to reducing
Italy's deficit. Political patronage has contributed to exaggerated governmental pend ding.^' Typical examples are health care
and disability pensions." In Italy local governments provide
health services, but they usually can't pay for them; the bill is
simply sent on to Rome for payment, thus contributing t o the
increased deficit.71Furthermore, there are a large number of
disability pensions in Italy. In fact, more disability pensions
are given than old-age pensions. These pensions are given not
because work in Italy is particularly dangerous, but rather to
secure votes or political favors from able-bodied worker^.'^
In sum, Italy must drastically cut government spending.
There are some encouraging signs. The Italian cabinet recently
approved a measure that calls for sweeping spending cuts and
increased revenue^.'^
B. Banking Deregulation
The task of banking deregulation presents many challenges
for Italy because Italy's entrepreneurial spirit and high rate of
domestic savings, coupled with an elitist domination of industry, have traditionally favored small enterprises, especially in
the financial sector.74
Most Italian banks are still geared t o the traditional idea
of selling their services primarily to current account customemphasis of a bank's business must shift from
e r ~ . ?"[Tlhe
~
money transmission (making payments) to selling products.
Banks are in the business of selling financial services rather

68.
Id.
69.
The problem can be traced to the generous social legislation of the 1970s.
Id. at 12.
70. Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73. Waddington, supm note 9.
74. Rags to Riches, Low-tech Niches, E C O N O M IFeb.
~ , 27, 1988, at 21 (Supp.)
(Survey: The Italian Economy).
Mar. 25, 1989, at 24.
75. Metamorphosis, Enter the Outsiders, ECONOMIST,
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than banking. Once they f d y appreciate this fact, banks will
have to imitate non-banks' sales methods."76 One example is
the credit card market; Italy's financial institutions have si&icant room for expansion in this area.77 The market is ripe:
Europeans, particularly Italians, still use cash to transact most
business.78 Italian bankers must search out and pursue these
types of opportunities to gain a foothold in European banking.
Italy's banks must also be freed from heavy governmental
regulation. The answers to the challenges that deregulation
poses do not lie in new political parties or ideas; as one observer candidly points out, Italy suffers from too much democra~ y . 'Voting
~
patterns shift nominally from year to yearegoThe
real answer to Italy's political problems and heavy regulation
lies in reform of the existing parties and the policies that an
overly pluralistic system has fostered. Those currently in power
must demonstrate the discipline and self-will necessary to alter
the current state of the deficit, heavy governmental control,
and political patronization that have characterized Italian
politics from the immediate post-war period to the present.
As inefficient practices are abandoned and regulation liberalized, Italian financial institutions will probably begin to invest in other related areas such as insurance or investment
services. "In preparation for the single market, each bank must
look at its customer base and its operating position within the
market to ascertain its business goals and formulate its strategies and plans."' This advice is particularly important for
Italian financial institutions because they have long had the
luxury of a state-controlled monopoly on financial services; they
must become more responsive to customer needs if they are to
keep speed, or actually even compete, with leaner and more aggressive European financial institutions.
Accordingly, Italy must privatize its banking industry. This
could provide the rapid solution that Italy needs. The Italian
government owns an extensive amount of most major industries and at least fay-one percent of nearly all banks.82 The
76.
Id.
77.
Europeans average just over one credit card per person while United States
citizens average four. Hosking, supm note 14, at 9.
78.
Id.
79.
The Case for Reform, E c o ~ o m s r ,May 26, 1990, at 29.
80.
Birth of the Thing, ECONOMIST,
May 26, 1990, at 5.
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Philip Young, Europe 1992, MAG. BANR MGMT.,Apr. 1990, at 52.
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Feb. 27, 1988, at 28.
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government has signaled that it will get out of all industries
where its involvement is unnecessary."
Results from the limited amount of privatization that has
already occurred in other sectors are encouraging. Productivity
has increased and jobs are now given on the basis of skill and
ability rather than as political fayom or by lottizzazione.
Furthermore, mergers and networking among Italian and
other European Community banks may better enable those
banks to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the Second Directive; additionally, mergers and networking must be
considered as part of the solution to many of Italy's current
banking problem^.'^ Some predict a "merger surge."85 Italian
banks must become bigger quickly in order to meet the capitalization requirements and the organizational demands of
doing business on a European scale. A general manager of a
large Italian bank opines that a a n k s with ratio and capital
deficiency problems should be absorbed by stronger banks."86
The Bank of Italy is encouraging such mergers?'
Perhaps networking among Italian and European Community banks is a viable alternative to actual mergers, given
the immense capital and organization required to accomplish a
merger. Unity is forthcoming but nationalistic ideals run deep
throughout the European Community; perhaps loosely formed
alliances or "constellations" will provide for a smoother and
faster transition process.88

Italy has not acted, nor typically does it act, until a crisis
forces it t d 9Some say that Italy can't afford to wait that long
this time.g0
Italians have long proved their ingenuity in the face of
apparently insurmountable obstacles; just think what they
might achieve if they could exercise their talents free of red
tape, in a stable financial and political climate, and with a
83. Id. at 31.
84. Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 15. see also Hosking, supra note 14, at 9.
85. Young, supra note 81, at 52.
86.
Lane, supra note 42, at 67.
87.
Id. at 64; Big Whimper?, supra note 7, at 15.
88.
Hosking, supra note 14, at 9.
89. Rome Fiddles While The Economy Burns, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 27, 1988, at 32
(Supp.) (Survey: The Italian Economy).
90.
Id.
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public sector which was just half as efficient as private industry. Italy could well become Europe's leading ec~nomy.~'

Italy must make progress quickly and it has the ability to
do so. Since the end of World War I1 the Italians have demonstrated, individually and as a nation, the ability to marshal
resources and capital t o create jobs and prosperity. The banking sector must do the same within the limits that the current
situation has imposed on it to assure its very survival.
The Italian government has recognized the deficit problem
and has taken sigruficant preliminary steps toward resolving it.
The government must continue the trends it has established by
curbing its appetite for domestic savings, thus permitting industry and financial services entrepreneurs to offer higher
investment returns.
Privatization has been slow in coming but a good trend has
been established. Given the impetus for efficiency created by
European unity, the Italian government must eventually divest
itself of non-essential enterprises. This will, among other benefits, alleviate some of the si@icant inefficiencies in the banking sector.
Italians may begin to invest some of their money abroad,
but this will likely be delayed until the average Italian investor
becomes more familiar with the financial services offered by
foreign banks. In the meantime, Italy's financial institutions
can reorganize and make the changes necessary to remain attractive to the Italian investor.
An immediate gain of market share for Italy in other European countries is unlikely. However, if Italian financial institutions succeed in maintaining a significant portion of their domestic market, they can use their solid base of domestic savings to reinforce their infrastructures for eventual expansion.
Even though compliance with the Second Directive is an
arduous task, Italy seems to be implementing the legislation
according t o the timetable established in the Second Directive.
Italy must not only comply with the requirements of the Second Directive, but it must also amplify the measures it has
undertaken t o reduce the deficit and make its banking industry
more efficient and competitive. There is no viable alternative.
The very survival of the Italian banking industry is a t stake.
In sum,the problems in this area are greater for Italy than
91.
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most of the other Member States of the European Community.g2However, Italy has initiated reforms, and present trends
suggest that these reforms are gaining momentum. The aggregate effect of the reforms, and the gradual augmentation of
Italian savers' knowledge of what foreign institutions and markets offer, could give Italian banks an opportunity to
strengthen themselves and prepare for the challenges of doing
business in a single European market. Italy could accelerate its
process of reform and demonstrate its traditional ability to turn
a crisis into huge success. Can we bank on Italy's response to
the Second Banking Directive of the European Community?
Only Italy can answer that question.
JeffreyA. Orr
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